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Abstract:
U.S. legal changes have made it easier to obtain patents on inventions that use software.
Software patents have grown rapidly and now comprise 15 percent of all patents. They
are acquired primarily by large manufacturing firms in industries known for strategic
patenting; only 5 percent belong to software publishers. The very large increase in
software patent propensity over time is not adequately explained by changes in R&D
investments, employment of computer programmers, or productivity growth. The residual
increase in patent propensity is consistent with a sizeable rise in the cost effectiveness of
software patents during the 1990s. We find evidence that software patents substitute for
R&D at the firm level; they are associated with lower R&D intensity. This result occurs
primarily in industries known for strategic patenting and is difficult to reconcile with the
traditional incentive theory of patents.
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Introduction
Federal courts, and to a lesser extent the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),
dramatically changed standards for patenting software-related inventions over the last
three decades. During the 1970s, federal court decisions typically described computer
programs as mathematical algorithms, which are unpatentable subject matter under U.S.
law.1 Systems using software could be patented, but only if the novel aspects of the
invention did not reside entirely in the software.2 At this time, the U.S. Congress
considered the question of patenting software and instead opted to protect computer
programs under copyright law.3
But after the Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Diehr in 1981,4 a series of
court and administrative decisions gradually relaxed the subject matter exception that
restricted the patenting of software-related inventions. The 1994 decision In re Alapat
eliminated much of the remaining uncertainty over the patentability of computer
programs.5 During this same period, new legislation and other court decisions lowered
standards for obtaining patents in general, while strengthening aspects of patent
enforcement.
This paper explores the general characteristics of software patenting over the last
two decades, paying particular attention to the rapid growth in software patenting and the
effect of this growth on R&D. We construct our own definition of a software patent
(there is no official definition) and assemble a comprehensive database of all such
patents. In Section I we describe this process, and the process of matching these patents
to firm data in the Compustat database. In Section II we summarize the general
characteristics of this data. We find that over 20,000 software patents are now granted
each year, comprising about 15 percent of all patents. Compared with other patents,

1

See, for example, the Supreme Court decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Parker v. Flook 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
3 U.S. Copyright law was amended in 1976, and more explicitly in 1980, to include computer
programs. See H. Rpt. No. 94-1476 (1976) and P.L. 96-517 (94 Stat 3028). There is a voluminous
literature on the merits of different forms of intellectual property protection for computer programs. See,
for example, Dam (1995), Graham and Zerbe (1996), and Samuelson et al. (1994).
4 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
5 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2
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software patents are more likely to be assigned to firms, especially larger U.S. firms, than
to individuals. They are also more likely to have U.S. inventors. Surprisingly, most
software patents are assigned to manufacturing firms and relatively few are actually
assigned to firms in the software publishing industry (SIC 7372). Most software patents
are acquired by firms in industries that are known to accumulate large patent portfolios
and to pursue patents for strategic reasons (computers, electrical equipment, and
instruments). These large inter-industry differences remain even after we control for
R&D, software development effort, and other factors.
In Section III we perform regressions that explore the “propensity to patent”
software inventions. This builds on the model of Hall and Ziedonis (2001) which, in turn,
builds on the empirical literature of “patent production functions” (including Scherer
1965, Bound et al. 1984, Pakes and Griliches 1984, and Griliches, Hall, and Hausman
1986). We find a dramatic growth in software patent propensity even after controlling for
R&D, employment of computer programmers, and other factors. This growth is quite
similar to the remarkable growth in patent propensity that Hall and Ziedonis (2001)
found in the semiconductor industry. Productivity-based explanations are unlikely to
account for even half of the rise in software patent propensity. The pattern of the residual
increase is consistent with the explanation that changes in patent law made software
patents significantly more cost effective. We also find that industries known for strategic
patenting have much higher patent propensities.
Section IV explores the effect of software patenting on R&D. According to the
traditional incentive theory, making software patents more cost effective should increase
the profitability of firms that make software inventions. This, in turn, should induce them
to increase their R&D spending. To test whether this in fact happened, we use a wellestablished empirical technique for estimating elasticities of factor substitution. We show
that the incentive hypothesis can be re-stated as the hypothesis that R&D and patents are
complements. This means that increases in the appropriability of software should lead to
greater R&D intensity. We find that this is not the case, however. Firms that increased
their software patenting relative to their overall level of patenting tended to decrease
their R&D intensity relative to other firms. This result is robust to a variety of
4

econometric and other considerations. But, again, this effect is concentrated in the
industries known for strategic patenting.
In Section V, we note that while our empirical analysis does not identify the
specific causal mechanisms at work, these results are difficult to reconcile with the
traditional incentive hypothesis. Strategic patenting provides an explanation for a rise in
patent propensity together with an apparent substitution away from R&D: firms may be
engaged in a patent “arms race.” The prominence of certain industries—known for
strategic patent behavior in other contexts—in our empirical results may not be
coincidental. Section VI concludes.
I.

Background and Data

A. Changing Legal Treatment and Strategic Patenting Industries
The erosion of the subject matter exception for computer programs occurred against a
backdrop of broader changes in patent law following the creation of a unified appeals
court for patents suits in 1982 (see Hall and Ziedonis 2001, for a nice summary). The
court raised the evidentiary standards required to challenge patent validity and tended to
broaden the interpretation of patent scope (Rai 2003, Merges 1997). The court relaxed
the standards for evaluating whether or not an invention is obvious to practitioners skilled
in the art (Cooley 1994, Dunner et al. 1995, Hunt 1999, Lunney 2001). The court was
also more willing to grant preliminary injunctions to patentees (Cunningham 1995,
Lanjouw and Lerner 2001) and to sustain large damage awards (Merges 1997, Kortum
and Lerner 1999). Finally, plaintiff success rates in patent infringement suits have
increased substantially (Lerner 1995).
Some of these changes made patents “stronger,” in the sense that patents became
more likely to be upheld in court or more effectively enforced. Others made patents
“cheaper,” in the sense that lower patentability standards reduced the effort required to
obtain a patent on a given invention. Together, these changes made patents more cost
effective than before, generating more appropriability per dollar invested in obtaining and
asserting them.
5

If patents did become more cost effective, the change is likely greater for software
than for other inventions, for two reasons. First, the presumption that computer programs
could not be patented was largely reversed by the mid-1990s. Second, a number of other
legal decisions relaxed the “enablement” requirement for software patents. Under U.S.
patent law, filers are required to provide detailed instructions explaining how the
invention works. It is supposed to be a “best mode” example of all of the patent claims.
For software patents and business methods, it seems the courts have largely eliminated
this requirement (Burk 2002, Burk and Lemley 2002).6 In the words of an IBM patent
attorney, “[the patent standard] currently being applied in the U.S. invites the patenting of
ideas that may have been visualized as desirable but have no foundation in terms of the
research or development that may be required to enable their implementation” (Flynn,
2001). The combined effect of these regulatory changes is that software patents appear to
have gained greater appropriability and became less costly to obtain in absolute terms
over time and also possibly relative to other patents.
Yet the software industry was highly innovative and growing rapidly well before
software patents became commonplace. Nominal investment in software grew 16 percent
per annum during the 80s (and 11 percent per annum during the 90s, Grimm and Parker
2000). This innovativeness is important for two reasons. First, in interpreting results
below, the growing use of software is an important factor. Second, given this history, it is
not at all clear that patent protection was essential for innovation in this industry.
This is not unusual. When surveyed, American firms in a number of other
innovative industries (including semiconductors and precision instruments) rate patents
as a relatively less effective form of appropriability (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen, Nelson,
and Walsh 2000). Instead, they cite lead time advantages, learning curves,
complementary sales and service and secrecy as generally more important sources of
appropriability.
6 Reviewing case law, Burk and Lemley (2002, p. 1162) write: “For software patents, however, a series
of recent Federal Circuit decisions has all but eliminated the enablement and best mode requirements. In
recent years, the Federal Circuit has held that software patents need not disclose source or object code,
flow charts, or detailed descriptions of the patented program. Rather, the court has found high-level
functional description sufficient to satisfy both the enablement and best mode doctrines.” See also Cohen
and Lemley (2001) on the different treatment of software patents.
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Yet even in industries where patents are rated as ineffective, we sometimes
observe that firms sometimes acquire large patent portfolios. These industries, including
the computer, electrical equipment and instruments industries, are also found to account
for a major share of the growth in patenting in recent years (Hall 2003). Some researchers
have suggested that firms in these industries may patent heavily in order to obtain
strategic advantages, including advantages in negotiations, cross-licensing, blocking
competitors, and preventing suits (Levin et al. 1987, fn 29, and Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh 2000). In principle, strategic patenting can arise whenever individual products
involve many patentable inventions and the cost of obtaining patents is sufficiently low
(see Bessen 2003 for a theoretical model). Firms may acquire large numbers of patents so
that even if they have an unsuccessful product, they can hold up rivals, threatening
litigation. Innovative firms may acquire “defensive” patent portfolios to make a credible
counter-threat. The outcome may involve the cross-licensing of whole portfolios, where
firms agree not to sue each other and those firms with weaker portfolios pay royalties
(Grindley and Teece 1997).
So, in what follows, it is natural for us to be alert to the possibility that software
patents may also be acquired for strategic purposes and we will find distinctive behavior
in the industries known for strategic patenting. An important implication of strategic
patenting is that policy changes that “strengthen” patents (or make them cheaper to
acquire) can lead to a kind of “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game that actually decreases the
private incentive to engage in R&D.
B. What Is a Software Patent?
How many software patents are being granted? Although the patent office maintains a
system for classifying patents, this system does not distinguish whether the underlying
technology is software or something else. Researchers must construct their own
definitions.
Some observers have sought to identify “pure” software patents where the
invention is completely embodied in software (e.g. Allison and Lemley 2000). We prefer
not to use such a definition for two reasons. First, beginning with Diamond v. Diehr,
7

attorneys have drafted software patents in such a way that they did not necessarily appear
to be patents on software.7 This makes the determination of a “pure” software patent
somewhat arbitrary and impractical for a comprehensive database. Second, we do not
necessarily assume that the subject matter exclusion is the only difference between
software patents and other patents. For example, we noted above that software patents are
subject to a different “enablement” requirement. So it is useful to study a somewhat
broader range of patents in any case.
Our concept of software patent involves a logic algorithm for processing data that
is implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is not “hard-wired.” These
instructions could reside on a disk or other storage medium or they could be stored in
“firmware,” that is, a read-only memory, as is typical of embedded software. But we want
to exclude inventions that involve only off-the-shelf software—that is, the software must
be at least novel in the sense of needing to be custom-coded, if not actually meeting the
patent office standard for novelty.
1. Identifying software patents
How can we identify patents that fit this description? Griliches (1990) reviews the two
main techniques that researchers have used to assign patents to an industry or technology
field: 1) using the patent classification system developed by the patent office; and 2)
reading and classifying individual patents. In this paper, we use a modification of the
second technique.
We began by reading a random sample of patents, classifying them according to
our definition of software, and identified some common features of these patents. We
used these to construct a search algorithm to identify patents that met our criteria. We
used this algorithm to perform a keyword search of the U.S. Patent Office database,
which identified 130,650 software patents granted in the years 1976 to 1999. Next, to
7 For instance, Cohen and Lemley (2001, p. 9) argue “The Diehr decision and its appellate progeny
created what might be termed ‘the doctrine of the magic words.’ Under this approach, software was
patentable subject matter, but only if the applicant recited the magic words and pretended that she was
patenting something else entirely.” In Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court ruled that an invention using
temperature sensors and a computer program to calculate the correct curing time in an otherwise
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validate the accuracy of this algorithm, we compared the results of our search against a
random sample of 400 patents which we had read and classified into software patents and
other patents. We also compared our results to samples and statistics generated by other
researchers. The details of the algorithm and characteristics of the sample are described
in the Appendix.
Compared to our random sample of 400 patents, this algorithm had a false
positive rate of 16 percent (that is, 16 percent of the patents the algorithm said were
software patents, were not) and a false negative rate of 22 percent (that is, it failed to
identify 22 percent of the patents we categorized as software patents).
We performed a number of other checks. First, we compared our list of software
patents to a set of 330 software and Internet patents identified in research conducted for
the papers by Allison and Lemley (2000) and Allison and Tiller (2003).8 These patents
were identified by reading a larger number of patents, but applying a more narrow
definition of software inventions (again, where the invention is completely embodied in
software).9 Virtually all (92 percent) of the software patents identified by Allison were
categorized as software patents by our algorithm. Thus our false negative rate for “pure”
software patents appears to be quite small (8 percent). Second, using statistics generated
by the research in Allison and Lemley (2000), we calculated an upper bound on the
comparable false positive rate of 26 percent.10 Given that we are using a broader
definition of software patent, it is reassuring to find that this number is not much larger

conventional process of molding rubber goods could be patented. We treat this as a software patent;
Allison and Lemley would not.
8 Thanks to John Allison for sharing his data with us. The data used in Allison and Lemley (2000) are
based on reading 1,000 randomly selected patents issued between mid 1996 and mid 1998. That data was
augmented in Allison and Tiller (2003) by examining 2,800 patents issued between 1990 and 1999
identified via a keyword search (for the terms Internet or world wide web) restricted to patents included in
classes 705, 707, or 709. Note that in the Allison and Tiller taxonomy, internet business method patents are
a subset of software patents.
9 Both papers state the following: “Another researcher might include within the Software classification
those inventions in which the algorithms are embodied in chips, but we have chosen to include within our
definition of Software only those inventions that consist purely of software that is not embodied in
hardware.”
10 Allison reports identifying 92 pure software patents in the sample of 1,000 evaluated in that paper
(private communication). This is somewhat higher than the 76 reported in the published version of the
paper. For the same years, the ratio of software patents to total patents calculated using our algorithm was
11.5%. Thus an upper bound on the false positive rate is (.115-.092*.92)/.115 = 26%.
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than the false positive rate generated when using our own random sample. Although the
algorithm does make errors, it performs reasonably well, and it seems unlikely that it
introduces significant biases to our patent counts or regression coefficients.
2. Using Patent Classes to Identify Software Inventions
Why did we use this rather laborious method rather than simply counting patents in
certain patent classifications? First, in a longitudinal study patent classes are problematic
because the classification system changes over time and the patent office continually reclassifies issued patents. Moreover, lawyers are known to draft patents so that they avoid
falling into certain classes in order to influence the examiner’s prior art search or some
other aspects of the examination (Lerner 2004, p. 19).
Second, economists have long recognized the poor correspondence between
patent classes and economic concepts of industry or technology (see, for example,
Schmookler 1966, Scherer 1982a, Scherer 1984, Soete 1983, and Griliches 1990). Patent
classes are not designed with social scientists in mind but are used primarily to aid prior
art search. Although patent classes can be used effectively when they are confined to
select sets of well-defined subclasses (e.g., Schmookler 1966, Lerner 2004), or when
classifications are statistically distributed over industries (e.g., Silverman 1999), or when
taken as loosely representative (e.g., Graham and Mowery 2003), a definition based on
patent classes is likely to introduce significantly more inaccuracies than the approach
chosen in this paper.11
In the case of the U.S. classification system, there are no patent classes for
software per se. Instead, software inventions are included in functional categories along
with hardware inventions. For instance, one class includes “arrangements for producing a
permanent visual representation of output data.” This is a functional description that

11 Allison and Lemley (2000) and Allison and Tiller (2003) also reject the idea of using patent
classifications to identify software patents. According to Griliches (1990), a patent class is “based
primarily on technological and functional principles and is only rarely related to economists’ notions of
products or well-defined industries (which may be a mirage anyway). A subclass dealing with the
dispensing of liquids contains both a patent for a water pistol and for a holy water dispenser. Another
subclass relating to the dispensing of solids contains patents on both manure spreaders and toothpaste
tubes” (Griliches 1990, p. 1666).
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includes software programs, hardware computer displays, and even electric and
mechanical signs that pre-date electronic computers.
Still, we did examine the efficacy of using the patent classification approach for
identifying software inventions, as proposed in Graham and Mowery (2003). In that
paper, the authors identified a number of subdivisions of the International Patent
Classification system (IPC) where many patents assigned to large U.S. software
companies may be found.12 We compared the list of software patents identified by this
approach with our random sample of 400 patents. The results were significantly worse
than our own algorithm: a 30 percent false positive rate and a 74 percent false negative
rate. We also found that this definition would exclude half of the patents obtained by the
top 200 publicly-traded software firms during the 1990s, and a majority of the pure
software and Internet patents identified in Allison and Tiller (2003). In contrast, our
definition accounts for about 4/5 of all patents obtained by the top 200 software firms in
the 1990s.
Nevertheless, to check whether our main results were robust to our choice of
algorithm, we ran most of our tabular analyses and regressions below using the GrahamMowery definition of software patent. Although standard errors were predictably higher,
the results were broadly similar. For example, the distribution across industries was
similar and patents and R&D were found to be statistically significant substitutes.
Although Graham and Mowery’s approach is useful for obtaining a rough impression, it
is not the best technique for a more comprehensive study such as ours, and attempts to
improve its coverage by adding more classes are likely to increase the false positive rate.
To summarize, our algorithm has a positive error rate. For this reason, one can
find patents that our algorithm incorrectly classifies as software patents (see Hahn and
Wallsten 2003). But the rate of false positives is reasonably low and the algorithm
appears to be substantially more accurate than at least one alternative based on patent
classes. Moreover, the evidence suggests that there is no systematic bias in these errors:
our main results hold even when we use a very different definition of software patent.

12

The subdivisions include G06F 3/, 5/, 7/, 9/, 11/, 13/, and 15/; G06K 9/, and 15/; and H04L 9/.
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C. The Matched Sample
We also explore the characteristics of the firms that obtained software patents and, in
particular, the relationship between software patenting behavior and firm R&D
performance. To do this, we matched a large portion of both software patents and other
patents to firms in the 1999 vintage of the Compustat database.
Our main population of interest consists of U.S.-owned public firms that perform
R&D. This group performs a large share of domestic R&D and it should provide a
relatively stable group for comparison over time. But it does limit the relevance of our
conclusions to this group, however, and so our analysis has little to say about start-up
firms, individuals, universities, etc.
We begin by matching our patents to firms (i.e. the assignees) using the NBER
Patent Citations Data File (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001a).13 This data set matches
patents to the 1989 vintage of firms contained in Compustat, so we do a variety of things
to supplement those matches:
1. We added the largest 25 publicly traded software firms ranked by sales (only
one of which is included in the NBER file).
2. We merged the data set with a set of firm-patent matches provided to us by
CHI Research.14 That data encompasses most of the significant patenting
firms (public or private) over the last 25 years.
3. Using data contained in Compustat, we identified 100 of the largest R&D
performers in 1999 that were not already included in our data set. We matched
these firms and their subsidiaries to their patents using a keyword search on
the USPTO web site.

13

To be precise, we match patent numbers in our data set with those found in the NBER data set.
Where available, we use the firm CUSIP assigned by NBER to obtain financial data from Compustat.
14 We again match by patent number and use the firm CUSIP assigned by CHI. Details on CHI’s
proprietary data is described at http://www.chiresearch.com/information/customdata/patdata.php3. We are
grateful to Tony Breitzman for sharing this data with us.
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The final file held 4,792 distinct subsidiaries and 2,043 parent firms from 1980 to 1999,
an improvement of 1,230 subsidiaries and 305 firms over the NBER database for the
same period.15
To test the coverage of this matched sample, we compared it to the target
population in Compustat (that is, all U.S. firms that publicly report financials with
positive R&D). The matched sample performed 91 percent of the deflated R&D in the
Compustat file over this period and accounted for 89 percent of the deflated sales by
R&D-performing firms. Moreover, the coverage ratios are roughly constant over the
entire sample period, varying only a few percentage points in each direction over two
decades. Over this period, the matched sample also accounts for 68 percent of all
successful U.S. patent applications by domestic non-government organizations (mostly
corporations) and 73 percent of software patents granted to these organizations. These
coverage ratios were also quite stable over the two decades.
However, only 37 percent of the R&D-performing firms contained in Compustat
are matched to their patents in our data set and this coverage declined over the sample
period as an increasing number of small firms have gone public since 1980. Thus this
matched sample is broadly representative of the firms that perform most of the R&D and
obtain the majority of patents, but it is not representative of entrants and very small firms.
Nevertheless, given the extent of our coverage of R&D and patents, the results we obtain
in our sample regarding patents and R&D will represent the overall interaction between
patents and R&D.
It is possible that sample selection may bias regression coefficients within the
matched sample. To check for this, we implement Heckman two-stage sample selection
models (below) and find, in general, that sample selection has little effect.
D. Other data
We used the NBER Patent Citations Data File (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001a) to
obtain data on citations received and numbers of claims. To obtain data on employment
15

The original NBER sample accounted for 47% of the successful patent applications to U.S. nongovernment organizations; our sample accounts for 68% of these patents.
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of programmers and engineers, we used the Occupational Employment Survey conducted
by the BLS. This source provides detailed occupational employment of 3 digit SIC
industries. Because not all industries were covered in all years of the survey during the
early years, we linearly interpolated employment shares.16 We also use a number of input
price indices from the BLS Multifactor Productivity series.

Summary Statistics

II.

Table 1 reports the number of software patents and other patents granted per year and
also the numbers of applications per year, conditional on the applications successfully
resulting in a grant by the end of 1999. As can be seen, their numbers have grown
dramatically in absolute terms and also relative to other patents. Today almost 15 percent
of all patents granted are software patents.
Table 1 also shows estimates of the number of software patents published by Greg
Aharonian.17 The overall trends are quite similar and the numbers in recent years are also
quite close. Clearly, our definition of software patents is more inclusive, especially
during the early years.
A. Who Owns Software Patents?
Table 2 shows characteristics of software patents compared with other patents, using data
from the NBER patent database. Software patents are more likely to be owned by firms
than by individuals or government. They are also more likely to be owned by U.S.
assignees and to have U.S. inventors.18 After the U.S., the top countries ranked by

16

Thanks to Joseph Bush of BLS for providing the data. The employment categories we used for
programmers were occupation codes 25102, systems analysts, and 25105, computer programmers; for
engineers, we used 22100 (a group code). Because computer support occupations (25103 and 25104) were
lumped in with the other codes during early years of the survey, we make a proportional adjustment in
those years, reducing the employment counts of programmers by their relative share in the first year in
which all categories were reported.
17 Aharonian used the “I know one when I see one” criterion (private communication). For many years
Aharonian has written articles on software patents in his Internet Patent News Service
(www.bustpatents.com). The numbers cited in table 1 are reprinted from p. 319 of Lessig (2001).
18 Allison and Lemley (2000) find that their sample of software patents has about the average share of
U.S. inventors, although they use a somewhat different method to classify inventors’ national origins.
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inventors are Japan (18 percent), Germany (3 percent), Great Britain (2 percent), and
Canada (2 percent).
Consistent with the findings of Allison and Lemley (2000), software patents tend
to receive a larger number of subsequent citations, and they have substantially more
claims per patent. Other research finds that these statistics may indicate greater private
value, although not necessarily greater social value (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001b,
Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001, Allison et al. 2003). In other aspects, software patents
are similar to other patents.
To obtain more information about the firms that obtain software patents, Table 3
shows firm characteristics by patent type (software vs. non-software) for our matched
sample. Relative to other patents, software patents tend to be obtained by firms with
larger market value, sales, and R&D budgets. They are slightly more likely to be
obtained by newly public firms. Allison and Lemley (2000) also find that software
patents are more likely to be obtained by larger entities as classified by the patent office.
B. The Distribution of Software Patents Across Industries
Table 4 shows the industries of the firms obtaining software patents in the sample
matched to Compustat. Most of the software patents are obtained by manufacturing
firms, especially in the electronics and machinery industries, which include computers.
Software publishers (SIC 7372) acquire only 5 percent of the patents in this sample, and
other software service firms, excluding IBM, account for 2 percent.19 The “usual
suspects” for strategic patenting—SIC 35, 36, 38 and IBM—account for 68 percent of
software patents.
The distribution of software patents across industries appears to reflect something
other than the creation of software. Columns 2 and 3 include two measures that reflect
software creation: the share of programmers and systems analysts employed in the
industry and the share of programmers, systems analysts and engineers. These are the
occupations most directly involved in the creation of software and so these shares
19

IBM accounts for 13 percent of the software patents in our sample and it is consistently the largest
software patentee. We break it out separately, as it is not representative of the software services industry.
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represent the relative software development effort; the first measure more narrowly than
the second.
The manufacturing sector acquires 75 percent of software patents but employs
only 11 percent of programmers and analysts (32 percent of software writers if engineers
are included). Software publishing and services (SIC 737, including IBM) acquires only
13 percent of software patents but employs 33 percent of programmers and analysts (18
percent if engineers are included). There is little reason to expect software developers
employed in software companies or finance or retailing to be far less productive than
software developers in manufacturing. These large differences suggest that industries
differ dramatically in the degree to which they seek patent protection for their software.
This disparity also appears in the fifth column, which reports the differences in
the simplest measure of patent propensity, the ratio of patents to R&D. Software
publishing firms get only a quarter of the number of patents per dollar of R&D that other
firms obtain. This corresponds to the views expressed by software publishing executives
that software patents are of little value to them (USPTO 1994).20 The sixth column
displays a measure of software patent propensity derived from the regression analysis
described below. Overall, software patents are more likely to be obtained by larger firms,
established firms, U.S. firms, and firms in manufacturing (and IBM); they are less likely
to be obtained by individuals, small firms, foreign firms, and software publishers.
III. The Rising Propensity to Patent Software
From 1987 to 1996 the number of successful software patent applications (granted by
1999) increased 16.0 percent per annum. This growth was greater than any of a number
of yardsticks one might measure it against: during roughly the same period, real
industrial R&D grew 4.4 percent per annum, employment in computer programming
related occupations grew at a 7.1 percent rate, and real business spending on ownaccount and outsourced programming grew 7.4 percent per year. This growth occurred

20

Also, BEA analysis of software investment (Parker and Grimm 2000) implies that about 30 percent
of software is produced as packaged software, the primary product of firms in SIC 7372. Yet this industry
acquires only 5 percent of software patents.
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against a general background of rising patent propensity—the ratio of all domestic patent
applications to real R&D—grew about 2.1 percent per year.21
We can identify several possible factors that might contribute to increased
software patenting: growth in R&D generally, growth in that portion of R&D which uses
software, greater productivity in software development, and changes in the costeffectiveness of software patents from regulatory or other sources. To help sort out the
roles played by these different factors, we use a “patent production function” model of
Hall and Ziedonis (2001).22 This production function relates the number of successful
patent applications made by a firm each year to its size, relative R&D spending and other
characteristics, plus a time dummy, which serves to capture residual changes in patent
propensity.
A. Specification
In the preferred specification of this model, the expected number of patents for firm i in
year t, conditional on firm characteristics for that firm and year, is


R & Dit
Capital it
E [nit ] = exp α t + β1 ln Employeesit + β 2 ln
+ β 3 ln
+ β 4δ i 
Employeeit
Employeeit



(1)

where δ is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is a new entrant and zero
otherwise. The right hand side variables capture the effects of scale, R&D intensity,
capital intensity and new entrant status. The time dummy then captures changes in the
propensity to patent. Differences in the time dummies between two different years
correspond to log differences in the expected number of patents. This is our initial
specification to which we add additional controls, including firm effects and a measure of
software development intensity.

21

Total industrial R&D increased from $121 billion in 1988 to $164 billion in 1998 in 1996 dollars
(NSF 2003). The BLS Occupational Employment Survey estimates 904,430 employees in “computer
scientists and related occupations” in 1987-89 and 1,839,760 in 1998. The BEA estimates $38billion in
1996 dollars for business spending on own-account and custom software in 1989 and $64billion in 1998
(Parker and Grimm 2000). The general increase in patent propensity has been explored by Kortum and
Lerner (1999) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001).
22 The literature on patent production functions also includes Scherer 1965, Bound et al. 1984, Pakes
and Griliches 1984, and Griliches, Hall, and Hausman 1986.
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Since the left hand side variable is a count and many observations are zero, the
equation can be estimated with a Poisson regression, as is frequently done in the
literature. The Poisson regression assumes that the variance equals the expected value of
the left hand side variable, but often Poisson specifications fail to meet this assumption
and show “over-dispersion.” Tests using a negative binomial specification reveal overdispersion in our data too, and, following Hall and Ziedonis (p. 113), we take this as an
indication to use heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors.
Our analysis differs from Hall and Ziedonis in two important ways, however.
First, our dependent variable is not all of the patent applications of the firm, just software
patent applications. In principle, this should cause no problem—one still expects size,
R&D intensity, etc. to affect the level of software patents. But we may also want to
control for the degree to which the firm directs resources to software development, which
we do below. Second, Hall and Ziedonis study a narrowly defined industry whereas we
study a broad range of industries. For this reason, we will want to control for industry or
firm effects in some of our regressions.
In our base specification nit is the number of software patents applications by firm
i in year t that resulted in a patent granted by 1999.23 Because patent prosecution
typically takes two years or so, we conduct our regressions through 1997. The other
variables are as follows: employees is the number of employees listed in Compustat in
thousands, R&D is deflated by the GDP deflator, and capital is property, plant and
equipment deflated by the NIPA capital goods deflator. The “new firm” dummy is equal
to one for the first five years a firm appears in Compustat.
B. Results
Column 1 shows the base regression. Column 2 adds seven industry dummies and
variables to capture the relative use of programming personnel. The first of these
variables is the ratio of “computer scientists and related occupations” to total industry
employment in the BLS Occupational Employment Survey (OES) for the firm’s SIC 3
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digit industry (or 2 digit if Compustat assigns the firm only two digits). The second
variable is the comparable share of engineers in total employment. The OES was
conducted on a three year cycle until 1995, so values for this variable in intervening years
are linearly interpolated. And for comparability, we only used OES data from 1987
onwards, so the second column covers a shorter interval.
The elasticity of the scale variable, employment, is similar to estimates in
previous studies. Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) obtained an elasticity of .87 on
R&D. Hall and Ziedonis obtained an elasticity of employment of .85 when they included
some firm controls. The coefficient of the R&D intensity variable is, however, much
higher than in Hall and Ziedonis, although when we include firm fixed effects below, this
difference largely disappears, suggesting that it is picking up unmeasured firm/industry
heterogeneity. Capital intensity (in column 2) is also significant and similar in magnitude
to one estimate by Hall and Ziedonis, but smaller than another. Hall and Ziedonis
interpret this coefficient as evidence that capital intensive firms may patent more because
they are subject to holdup by rivals who patent strategically. That is, this is evidence of
“defensive patenting.” Our result suggests this hypothesis might apply more generally.
1. New vs. Old Firms
We find that the “new firm” dummy variable is not significant. In contrast, Hall and
Ziedonis find that their dummy variable is highly significant and has a relatively large
coefficient.24 They suggest that their result arises from new semiconductor design firms
that need patents to secure financing (see also Hall 2003). These smaller firms do not
have complementary manufacturing facilities that may provide another means of
appropriability.
23 In our data, we only observe patent applications that are successful. After November 2000, patent
applications are generally published 18 months after the filing date. But publication is not required if the
inventor does not seek patents abroad.
24 There is also a difference between the definition of our new firm variable and theirs. Hall and
Ziedonis include all firms that entered Compustat after 1982. We include firms that entered in 1982 or
later, but our dummy variable equals one only for the first five years of entry. Their initial interest was to
compare whether incumbent firms in particular benefited from the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Our interest is whether entrants appear to find additional benefits from software patents,
something Hall and Ziedonis explored specifically for entrant design firms with an additional dummy
variable.
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Although our sample may not be representative of the entire population of new
firms, this regression does include a reasonably large sample of new firms (1,308
observations during the first five years of 314 firms). Hence our different result suggests
that either software patents are not comparably useful for obtaining financing in general
or this “vertical disintegration” strategy is not broadly relevant outside the semiconductor
industry, or both.
We explored this issue further by interacting the new firm dummy variable with
industry dummy variables. Only one of these interaction terms was statistically
significant, the one for SIC 73, business services, which in our sample largely consists of
software services and pre-packaged software firms. Column 3 shows a regression with
just this interaction term added. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that new software firms obtain fewer software patents than established firms.25
This suggests that new software firms may not obtain the same benefit from patents as do
new semiconductor firms.
2. Cross Industry Variation in Software Patent Propensity
Returning to Column 2, the coefficients on the industry dummies indicate large interindustry differences in software patent propensity even after controlling for industry
employment of programmers and engineers. Given the exponential specification, (1),
differences between industry coefficients correspond to differences in the log of software
patent propensity. Column 6 of Table 4 shows corresponding differences in software
patent propensity itself (that is, the exponential of the coefficients), normalized so that
the software patent propensity of SIC 73 equals one (this includes IBM). As can be seen,
the differences are quite large, with SIC 36 and SIC 38 obtaining an order of magnitude
more software patents, all else equal, and machinery, SIC 35, not too far behind. In
general, the industries that have a high propensity to patent software also have a high
patent propensity in general (see column 5 of Table 4), although the differences in

25

We also ran these regressions using the total number of patents, not just software patents, as the
dependent variable and obtained similar results (not shown). Graham and Mowery (2003) report that the
software patent propensities of established software publishers rose over the 1990s, but for entrant firms
(those founded after 1984) there was no discernable trend.
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software patent propensity are larger. In the literature, these are the industries known for
strategic patenting (see section IV).
The magnitude of these differences and the known importance of strategic
patenting in electronics and computers, suggests that these results may be the outcome of
strategic patenting. To test this idea further, column 4 drops the industry dummies but
includes instead a measure of the degree to which other firms in the industry patent. This
variable is the number of all patents obtained by other firms in the same 2 digit industry
as the observed firm, divided by the employment of those firms. The positive and
significant coefficient suggests that firms obtain more software patents in industries that
patent more overall, all else equal. This result is consistent with “defensive” patenting,
although it could also arise from other industry differences, such as large differences in
alternative means of appropriability.
3. Unobserved Heterogeneity
Our seven industry dummy variables do not capture the full extent of inter-industry
heterogeneity or other firm heterogeneity. This was confirmed by tests using the random
effects and fixed effects Poisson models in Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). We then
face the choice of better controlling for this unobserved heterogeneity via a random
effects or a fixed effects model. A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the
random effects estimates are consistent; that is, the firm effects appear to be correlated
with the coefficients (P = 0.000), indicating that fixed effects are preferred.
Column 5 presents the fixed effects Poisson regression. This is a conditional
maximum likelihood regression where the likelihood of each observation is conditioned
on the likelihood of the observed sum of software patents for each firm over all years in
the panel. This is only calculated for firms that have software patents in at least one year.
Since many firms obtain no software patents, the sample size is reduced considerably for
this regression. With fixed effects, the scale elasticity is somewhat smaller, and is
consistent with earlier research (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984) and the R&D
intensity coefficient is now much more in line with the estimates in Hall and Ziedonis
(2001).
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In Figure 1, we plot the year dummies from this regression (normalized to equal 1
in 1987), those from the Column 1 regression, which spans a longer time period, and the
corresponding year dummies from Hall and Ziedonis’s preferred specification. As can be
seen, after the mid-80s, all three series grow rapidly, persistently and at about the same
rate. Compared to the rate for 1987, and holding all other factors constant, firms were
successfully applying for nearly 50 percent more software patents in 1991, and 164
percent more by 1996.
4. The Ebb and Flow of Copyright Protection
One factor that may explain the large increase in software patent propensity is
diminishing protection for computer programs provided by copyright. Lemley and
O’Brien (1997) describe the rise and fall of the “nonliteral infringement” doctrine.
Established in the 1986 decision in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, it
gave copyright holders some protection over the features of their software programs. But
the doctrine was rejected in the 1992 decision in Computer Associates International v.
Altai.26 If the alternative of copyright protection affected firms’ propensity to obtain
patents, then one might expect a decrease in patent propensity after 1986, and then an
increase after 1992. No significant fluctuation is observed in Figure 1 and regression tests
for a break find only a very small change in trend.27 Moreover, the industries that patent
most heavily also tend to use embedded software, so copyright protection was less
relevant to them.
C. Interpretation
We use the fixed effects specification to interpret the relative influence of various right
hand variables. Because (1) is exponential in form, changes in variables times their
coefficients affect the log of software patents and can be interpreted as growth rates. To
calculate annual growth rates, we evaluate the mean of each variable in 1996 and subtract
797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir 1986) and 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir 1992), respectively.
We used a regression similar to column 5 of Table 5 with a time trend instead of year dummies. We
interacted the time trend with an interval dummy for the years 1986-92 and found a very small (-.002), but
statistically significant reduction in the rate of growth in software patent propensity during this interval.
This effect is on the order of 5% of the overall growth rate in software patent propensity.
26
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the mean in 1987. We then multiply this difference by the estimated coefficient from
column 5 and divide by 9 (the number of years elapsed) to obtain an annual contribution
of the variable to the growth of software patents for our sample. The resulting estimates
are shown to the right of column 5. A similar calculation for the year dummies is shown
for all columns in a separate row.
The annual growth of software patenting among the firms in this sample (which
excludes firms without any software patents over this entire period) is 16.4 percent,
slightly larger than the aggregate 16.0 percent reported above. The majority of this
increase is captured by the contribution of the year dummies (10.8 percent). The next
largest contribution is from greater capital intensity (1.8 percent) followed by the growth
in programmer employment (1.2 percent), engineering employment (1.2 percent) and
R&D intensity (1.1 percent).
Thus the majority of the growth in software patenting is not attributed to any of
these explicit controls and can be attributed, instead, to rapidly rising patent propensity.
Note that this increase in patent propensity is quite close to the result obtained by Hall
and Ziedonis (2001) for all patents in just the semiconductor industry. A comparable
calculation on their preferred specification also results in a 10.8 percent annual growth in
patent propensity from 1987 – 95.28 But such growth rates are far from typical for total
patenting in most industries.
1. Taking into Account Productivity Growth
In principal, software patent propensity can be decomposed into two factors: an increase
in the productivity of software developers, and change in the cost-effectiveness of
patenting.29 The first factor means that software developers may produce more inventions
using the same level of inputs. The second means that firms find it more attractive to
patent a higher proportion of inventions, perhaps because the cost of doing so has fallen,
or because such patents provide larger benefits than they did in years past, or possibly
both.

28
29

Thanks to Rosemarie Ziedonis for graciously sharing data.
See Hall and Ziedonis (2001) for a similar discussion.
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A thumbnail calculation suggests that changing cost-effectiveness is the major
factor accounting for the rise in patent propensity. The productivity of software
developers is notoriously difficult to estimate. Although there has been strong market for
software development tools, the actual contribution of these tools to productivity is
widely debated and studies find that computer aided software engineering tools often go
unused (Kemerer 1992). Nevertheless, we can calculate an upper bound for programmer
productivity growth using price indices for the pre-packaged software industry. As we
discuss below, these estimates are likely to exaggerate productivity growth for software
developers involved in the R&D process.
From 1992 to 1997 receipts of the pre-packaged software industry (SIC 7372)
grew 18.5 percent per annum while employment grew 14.2 percent per annum (Census
2003). From the OES survey, we know that within SIC 737, employment of computer
science related occupations grew 2.4 percent faster than total employment, so we
estimate that programmer employment in pre-packaged software grew 16.6 percent per
annum. Thus nominal growth of software revenue per programmer was about 1.9 percent
per annum, less than a fifth of the estimated increase in software patent propensity.
But we must also take into account improvements in the quality of software
produced. A recent literature has developed price indices for pre-packaged software using
both matched-model methods and hedonic methods (see Grimm and Parker 2000, and
Abel, Berndt, and White 2003). The BEA has a matched model estimate of a -3.5 percent
price change per annum over this period and this corresponds well to other matched
model estimates. Hedonic price estimates, based on a small number of applications,
usually show more rapid price declines, although some economists have questioned
whether these estimates are reliable (Oliner and Sichel 1994). The BEA makes a seat-ofthe-pants quality adjustment to come up with a pre-packaged software price index that
has a growth rate of -6.8 percent over this same period. Combining these estimates, real
pre-packaged software per programmer grew either 5.4 percent per annum (using the
matched model index) or 8.7 percent per annum (using the quality adjusted index).
These figures are clearly less than the 10.8 percent annual rate of patent
propensity growth. But they very likely substantially overstate the growth in programmer
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productivity per se. The BEA, in fact, attributes most of estimated price decline to growth
in the market for software driven by rapidly falling prices for complementary computer
hardware (Grimm and Parker 2000, p. 6). With the total market growing rapidly each
year and small marginal costs of production, much of the estimated price decline is
attributable to economies of scale. But what matters for patent propensity is the
productivity of software developers at actually creating new software (e.g., new titles of
pre-packaged software) rather than duplicating software that already exists. Subtracting
the large scale economies, this productivity growth rate must be substantially less than
5.4 percent or 8.7 percent per annum. At the very least, growing cost-effectiveness of
patents accounts for some substantial portion of the rise in software patent propensity and
may well account for most of it.
D. The Cost-Effectiveness of Software Patents
Software patents may have become more cost-effective because of the regulatory changes
described in Section I. Eliminating the subject matter exclusion and reducing the nonobviousness and enablement requirements may have made software patents much easier
(less costly) to obtain. Stronger enforcement and a greater presumption of validity may
have increased the appropriability each patent delivered. Both served to decrease the cost
of appropriability.30
Strategic patenting may have amplified the effect of these changes. Reductions in
the cost of appropriability may encourage firms to pursue more aggressive strategic
behavior (Bessen 2003). This may, in turn, induce other firms to engage in defensive
patenting, further increasing the patent propensity. Both the importance of capital
intensity and the large industry effects found above suggest that strategic patenting may
play an important role and that this role may have increased over time.
In summary, the outsized growth in software patenting is not adequately
explained by research inputs, productivity growth, or other observable factors. There is a
30 Another

possibility is that alternatives to patents became less effective, increasing the relative cost
effectiveness of software patents. But survey evidence suggests that trade secrecy did not decrease in
importance and may have increased (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). We address changes in the efficacy
of copyright protection in section III.
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significant residual trend in software patent propensity on the order of 5 percent to 10
percent a year, roughly 2.5 to 4 times larger than the trend for patents in general. Such
increases would be consistent with firm responses to regulatory changes that have
increased the appropriability of software patents, made them easier to obtain, or both.
Moreover, the pattern of large inter-industry differences in patent propensity (and the
importance of capital intensity) are consistent with models of strategic patenting
IV. R&D and Software Patents
The traditional incentive theory suggests that more cost-effective patents for software
should lead to increased R&D spending, all else equal. With “cheaper” and/or “stronger”
patent protection, firms should patent more software inventions and/or realize greater
profits from the software inventions they patent. Expecting greater profits, firms should
find it profitable to spend more on R&D, all else equal. If the incentive hypothesis is
correct, the increase in the cost effectiveness of software patents identified in the
preceding section should be positively correlated with increases in firms’ R&D
investments. In this section, we test this hypothesis.
To do so, we must control for other factors so that, to the extent possible, we hold
“all else equal.” In a dynamic world with shifting demand and supply and changing
prices, firms may increase or decrease their R&D spending for reasons unrelated to
changes in the appropriability of software patents. For example, a firm facing growing
demand may increase R&D because increases in demand may make heretofore
marginally unprofitable R&D projects profitable. This renders any simple correlation
between software patenting and R&D spending unpersuasive.
Of course empirical economists have developed techniques for analyzing the
relationship between two quantities against a backdrop of shifting prices, namely, by
estimating elasticities of factor substitution (see Berndt 1991 for a general review). These
techniques allow economists to identify whether two factors are complements or
substitutes. The problem here is quite similar if one considers R&D and patents to be
factors of production (for the production of profits, rather than physical output). In other
words, the incentive theory is akin to saying that patents and R&D are complements.
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Greater use of patents should be associated with greater use of R&D. And if patents
become more cost effective—that is, if their quality-adjusted price falls—then the share
of resources allocated to R&D relative to other factors of production should increase.
A. A Simple Model
To see that the incentive argument is equivalent to complementarity of R&D and patents,
it is helpful to consider a simple generalization of the formal patent race models that have
been used as the basis of the incentive hypothesis. In these models, the more R&D a firm
does on a project, the greater the probability that the firm will make a successful product
innovation (first). Abstracting away from issues of timing and taking the actions of other
firms as given, let P(r) be this probability of success. Since R&D activities on this project
will have diminishing returns, we assume that P is increasing, concave and that P (0) = 0 .

Let r be the quantity of R&D performed at price w.
If the firm successfully innovates and gets a patent, then it earns a discounted
stream of rents during the term of the patent (and perhaps some profits afterwards). If the
discounted stream of production costs associated with the product is C, then the profits
equal A ⋅ C , where A is the markup above cost. The expected profits on the project are

π = A ⋅ C ⋅ P(r ) − w r .

(2)

In the patent literature, policy features such as patent term and scope affect
expected profits, and these features correspond to different levels of A. In other words, A
can be interpreted as a measure of appropriability.31 To the extent that a project can be
protected by software patents, stronger, more cost-effective patents should increase A.
The firm’s optimal level of r can be found by examining the first order condition of (2).
Then straightforward calculation shows that increases in A generate increases in the
equilibrium level of r. Moreover, if the scale of production remains relatively constant,
then the ratio of R&D expenses, w ⋅ r , to production cost, C , will also increase.
It is theoretically possible, however, that the scale of production for a successful
project may increase or decrease with appropriability—for example, an increase in A
31

See Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen (2003) for a similar decomposition taken to the data.
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might be associated with a change in market structure from a duopoly to a monopoly.
Diverse empirical evidence suggests that substantial changes in production scale are
unlikely in the broad range of industries studied here. Cohen and Klepper (1996) argue
that “the level of output over which rents from R&D are realized is closely related to the
firm’s output at the time it conducts its R&D.” More generally, in many industries, firms
achieve appropriability mainly through lead time, learning-by-doing, complementary
services, etc. and patents only play a secondary role (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen, Nelson,
and Walsh 2000). Any improvement in appropriability conveyed by patents is unlikely to
have a drastic effect on market structure in these industries because firms already have
significant appropriability. In Table 6 below, we find that software patents did not appear
to influence profit margins significantly, also suggesting that industry structure is
unlikely to change dramatically in response to the availability of software patents.
A positive association between appropriability and R&D cost share is a necessary
condition for patents and R&D to be Hicks-Allen complements. It also fits nicely with a
standard technique for evaluating factor demand by using cost share equations. This
technique uses relative cost shares (the cost of an input factor relative to total production
costs) regressed against log relative prices of input factors. For example, the ratio of
energy costs to total production costs is regressed against log relative prices of labor,
capital, energy, etc. These equations are derived from a flexible form translog cost
function (see Greene, 1997, Chapter 15.6). For a regression that uses one input factor as a
dependent variable (say, energy), if the relative price of another factor (say, labor) has a
positive coefficient, then these two goods cannot be complements.32 Moreover, this test
takes into account both the direct effect of price changes on consumption of the left hand
side good (the substitution effect) and also the overall effect of the price change on total
costs (the income effect).
B. Estimation

To apply this technique to our problem, we can treat both R&D and patents as input
factors in addition to conventional input factors. Then, following the standard analysis, a
32

To be complements, the coefficient must be less than ( −1) ∗ the product of the two cost shares.
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regression equation can be derived from a procedure of minimizing costs while holding
revenues constant. This equation would be
r
= α + γ 0 ⋅ ln c +
C

(3)

∑γ

j

⋅ ln p j

j

where C is total cost (redefined here to include R&D costs as well as production costs), c
is the “cost of appropriability” (the quality-adjusted cost of patents, not observed), p j
are prices of other input factors (taking one as numeraire), and the Greek symbols are
coefficients to be estimated.33 This technique is preferred to estimating quantities when
analyzing firm-level data under the assumption that prices are likely to be exogenous to
the firm (Berndt 1991).
Since we do not observe the cost of appropriability, we do the following: We
include time dummies in the regression which will soak up, among other things, overall
changes in the cost of patenting and the “strength” of patents. We believe that a
substantial part of the rise in software patenting is a response to increases in the
“strength” of patents for software inventions and/or decreases in the cost of patenting
these inventions (see section III). In that case, the share of software patents in a firm’s
total patenting, denoted s, serves as a proxy that captures variations in the relative cost of
appropriability across firms and over time.
Taking differences to sweep out firm fixed effects, our regression equation is
∆

(4)

rit
= α t + β ⋅ ∆sit +
C it

∑γ

j

⋅ ∆ ln pitj .

j

We use five-year differences to reduce noise from measurement error and any biases
associated with partial factor adjustment.
We calculate the R&D cost share as the ratio of R&D spending to total costs
measured as the sum of cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative
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Typically, a system of equations is jointly estimated for each input factor (but one). Here, we
estimate only a single equation, in differences, because we do not have full information on other factor
inputs. Our estimates are still consistent, but not as efficient as they would be if we could estimate multiple
equations.
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expenses. Since not all firms report these cost items, we also use an alternative measure,
R&D/sales (see below).
The software share of patents, s, is measured as the number of software patents
applied for in a given year divided by the total number of patents applied for that year,
conditional on the patents having been issued by 1999. Since patents take on average
about two years to issue, we only use patent applications through 1997. Also, this
software patent share measure is subject to sampling error—this measure will have large
variance for firms with small numbers of patents. To reduce heteroscedasticity, we use
Weighted Least Squares and we also report heteroscedastic consistent standard errors.34
Below, we check that our results hold without this weighting. We also check for possible
correlation between ∆s and the error term.
The price variables are annual industry price indices from the BLS Multifactor
Productivity report at the two-digit level for manufacturing and for the private non-farm
business sector for non-manufacturing firms. In addition to capital, labor, materials,
energy, and purchased services, we include an index for the price of IT capital, to control
for the influence of IT.35 To check that our results did not depend on any possible errors
in these prices, we also ran our main regressions using a full set of interacted year and
two-digit industry dummies. The coefficients of interest changed only slightly.
C. Results

Column 1 in Table 6 shows a regression of equation (4) for the years 1991-97. The
coefficient on software patent share is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. A
negative value indicates a negative conditional correlation between our measure of the
declining relative cost of appropriability and the R&D cost share. That suggests these two
inputs are substitutes and not complements.

34

The weight used is (1 nt + 1 nt − 5 ) , since the sampling variance for s is proportional to n.
−1

35

We use data from the April 2001 release. Thanks to Bill Gullickson and Steve Rosenthal of BLS for
providing the data. We also used separate indices for the components of IT capital, but these did not
change the non-price coefficients and they were highly multi-collinear.
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As noted above, the cost variable is missing for many observations. Firms
reporting cost of goods sold tend to fall disproportionately in manufacturing and this
might bias results. Column 2 tests the significance of this sample selection and also of
firms not matched to the patent file by running a Heckman sample selection model. This
model consists of a regression equation and a probit equation (not shown) estimated on a
binary variable indicating whether the observation is included in the regression reported
in column 1. The regression coefficients are adjusted to reflect biases arising from the
sample selection process. For the probit, we used log market value, log deflated sales, a
new firm flag and year dummies on the right hand side. The probit coefficients are highly
significant and a likelihood ratio test indicates the probit regression as a whole is highly
significant. While a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the two equations are
independent, any resulting bias in the coefficient of software patent share seems small.
Estimated with the sample selection correction, the coefficient remains negative and is
highly significant.
Another way to test the incentive hypothesis is to see whether software share
changed the markup over cost. To do this, column 3 regresses the change in log deflated
sales against the change in software share and the change in log deflated cost. The
coefficient of the change in log cost is not significantly different from 1, consistent with
constant returns to scale. If software patents increased profit margins, then in this
regression the software share should have a positive coefficient. The estimated
coefficient is positive but quite small and not statistically significant. It appears the
software patents did not have any substantial effect on markups.
Although sample selection does not seem to indicate a substantial bias, our
regressions will be more representative, and estimated more precisely, if we expand the
sample size. We can do this by using the ratio of R&D to sales—R&D intensity—as the
dependent variable instead of R&D cost share. So long as firm profit margins do not
change dramatically, the ratio of R&D to sales will remain roughly proportional to the
ratio of R&D to cost. We verified that the ratio of cost to sales does not change much on
average (there is a variance of about .001 per year) where cost data is not missing. Also,
the previous regression shows that changes in profit margin are uncorrelated with
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changes in software share. This means that using R&D intensity instead of R&D cost
share will not bias the coefficient of software share. Finally, to eliminate cases where
profit margins were likely to change dramatically, we trimmed a small number of
observations where R&D spending exceeded half of annual sales.36
Column 4 of Table 6 repeats the basic regression equation using the change in
R&D intensity as the dependent variable. The sample size is almost four times larger and
standard errors are about one third the size of those in column 1. The coefficient on
software share is quite similar. Further, in column 5 we repeat the Heckman sample
selection model regression. Here the null hypothesis that the sample selection equation is
independent of the regression equation cannot be rejected. Thus using the change in R&D
intensity as the dependent variable appears to provide a more representative and larger
sample. For this reason, we use this dependent variable in the subsequent analysis.37
Our historical and legal research suggests that the substitution of patents for R&D
might be explained by changes in the cost/benefit of software patents—that these patents
were made “stronger” and/or cheaper during the 90s. Consistent with this view, we
conducted the previous regressions from 1991 to 1997. To check that this time period is
not arbitrary, column 6 repeats the regression of column 3 over a longer period with the
change in software share interacted with three time dummies. These results show that the
substitution effect follows the same time pattern as was observed for patent propensity in
the last section. There was a positive, but insignificant effect during the late 80s, and
negative and highly significant coefficients during the 90s. The magnitude of the
substitution effect appears to increase in the late 90s, but the difference from the early
90s is not statistically significant.
The observed substitution effect is economically significant. Thumbnail
calculations suggest that by the end of the 1990s, R&D would have been about 10
36 This screen eliminated 121 observations in total of some 39 firms. These firms were mainly startups
(34), mostly biotech (25) and each of these firms had observations for other years that were included in the
sample. To verify that this trimming did not introduce a bias, we performed a Heckman sample selection
analysis on just the selection created by this trimming. The null hypothesis that the sample selection
equation (with log market value, log sales, new firm flag, R&D intensity, lagged R&D intensity, and year
dummies as regressors) was independent of the regression equation could not be rejected (P = .859).
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percent higher without the substitution. This is equivalent to about $16 billion in private
R&D, or roughly eight years of the long run average increase in R&D intensity among
American firms.38
1. Robustness Checks

To verify that our results were not unduly influenced by the use of weighted least
squares, we repeated the regression in column 4 using ordinary least squares but
eliminated observations for years where a firm filed fewer than five patents. This left
1,933 observations and a coefficient estimate for ∆s of -.010 (.005), suggesting that the
substitution effect exists without the weights, but WLS estimates are more efficient.
It is possible that ∆s might be correlated with the error term because R&D and
patenting decisions are made simultaneously. To test this, we instrumented ∆s with
lagged values and re-ran the regression in column 4 as an IV regression. When we
instrumented with one and two year lags, the resulting coefficient was -.103 (.033),
suggesting that any bias might actually be downwards. Comparing the instrumented and
non-instrumented regressions, a Hausman test could not reject the null hypothesis that the
uninstrumented version is consistent with a P value of .999 ( χ 2 (13) = 1.74). So
endogeneity of ∆s does not appear to be a problem. Similar results were obtained using
just a two-year lag.
To make sure that the substitution result was not influenced by possible error in
the BLS price series we used, we replaced the changes in log prices with terms for the
year dummies interacted with 2 digit industry dummies.39 Thus, we picked up all industry
trend variables in addition to sweeping out individual firm effects through differencing.
Given the large industry effects shown in Table 5, undoubtedly some of the variation in
∆s was picked up in these interaction terms, reducing the coefficient on ∆s. As expected,
37

We also performed all of the following analysis using the change in R&D cost share as the
dependent variable. Results were generally quite similar, but with larger standard errors
38 A 10 percent increase in software share over the decade times a coefficient of -.037 divided by mean
R&D intensity of about 3.5 percent. The dollar estimate is based on the level of industrial R&D in 1998
(NSF 2003). The average annual increase in the ratio of industrial R&D to net sales, as reported by NSF, is
.04 percentage points.
39 Several industries had very few firms, so we combined seven 2 digit industries into other industries.
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the estimated coefficient was a bit less, but still significant at the 1 percent level,
-.025 (.010). Thus the substitution effect appears robust to a variety of estimation
concerns.
2. Industry

Column 1 of Table 7 considers whether our results may be limited to one or two
industries by interacting the change in software share of patents with industry dummies.
We find a significant negative substitution effect for SIC 35 (which includes the
computer industry), SIC 36 (electronics, including semiconductors), and SIC 73
(business services, including software and IBM).40 For other industries, the coefficient is
not significantly different from zero.
The substitution effect thus seems to occur mainly in those industries known for
strategic patenting. Column 2 divides the industries into strategic ones (SIC 357, 36, 38
and IBM) and the rest. Firms in the strategic patenting industries exhibit a large and
highly significant substitution effect; for firms in other industries, the coefficient is not
significantly different from zero, indicating neither a substantial substitution nor
complementary effect.
3. Outsourcing Software Production

The use of software throughout the economy grew rapidly during the 1990s and so it is
important to examine the possibility that the increasing ubiquity of software may
somehow spuriously cause the correlations observed in Table 6. There are two potential
mechanisms to consider: the use of purchased software within the firm generally, and the
use of software in the R&D process itself.
Investment in software also grew rapidly during the 90s, especially in the form of
purchases of pre-packaged software (see Grimm and Parker 2000). It is possible that as
firms purchased more software from other companies, they reduced the internal

40

If IBM is excluded, the coefficient on SIC 73 is no longer significantly different from zero.
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production of software, some of which may have been classified in the R&D budget.41
This would have reduced R&D spending and R&D intensity.
Two arguments militate against this explanation. First, one would expect that if
firms are developing less software internally, they are less likely to obtain software
patents. In that case, software patent share would not rise as much, or might even fall.
Then the correlation between changes in software patenting share and R&D intensity
would likely be positive. Second, our regressions control for externally purchased IT,
which includes software (both outsourced and pre-packaged).42 To test this further, we
also performed the regressions with separate price indices for computers and software
(these are components of the BLS IT price index) and found essentially the same results.
So the use of purchased or outsourced software does not seem to explain the negative
association between software patent share and R&D intensity reported in Table 6.
4. The Use of Software in R&D

The second possible mechanism for a spurious correlation is an increase in the
importance of software in the R&D process itself. Firms employ software to design
products, both by using tools, like computer-aided engineering software, and by using
embedded software in hardware products that were formerly hard-wired. In other words,
software may reduce the cost of performing R&D. So in principle, it is possible that firms
that use software to design new products might obtain patents on this software and, under
certain conditions, they might also spend less on R&D.
There are several reasons to suggest that this does not explain the negative
correlation we observe. First, this explanation only works if the demand for R&D is
relatively inelastic. If software use reduces the cost of performing R&D, then R&D
projects that were marginally unprofitable before become profitable. If there are a
sufficient number of marginal projects, then the lower effective cost of each project will
41

In Compustat, software development spending is included in R&D, unless it is paid for by a
customer.
42 The coefficient on the change in the log of the IT price index is consistently positive, indicating that
IT does substitute for R&D. Dropping this variable from the regression only changes the coefficient of s
slightly. That suggests the relationship between utilization of IT and R&D is different from the interaction
between software patents and R&D.
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be offset by the increase in the number of projects performed. That is, if R&D demand is
sufficiently elastic, any reductions in the effective cost of conducting R&D would cause
firms to increase R&D intensity. We know from studies of the R&D tax credit that the
demand for R&D is rather elastic with respect to its tax price. Berger (1993) finds that
reductions in the tax price of R&D increased R&D intensity. In a survey of the literature,
Hall and van Reenen (2000) find that the tax price elasticity of R&D is around -1; at this
level, changes in the price of R&D should have little effect on R&D intensity. Thus, this
evidence suggests that the demand for R&D is sufficiently elastic so that software use
cannot explain the negative correlation.
Second, we can also control for software use. If increased use of software in the
R&D process is causing the negative coefficient on the change in software share, then
including the change in the relative employment of programmers and engineers in the
regression should reduce or eliminate this association. Column 3 of Table 7 repeats the
R&D intensity regression, but includes the change in the share of programmers and
systems analysts in industry employment and the change in the share of employment of
engineers. The coefficient of ∆s hardly changes, indicating that the substitution effect is
orthogonal to the employment of software writers.43
Third, it is hard to reconcile this explanation with the cross-industry pattern of the
substitution effect. Software is used in the design and development of new products and
processes in a wide range of industries, some of them strategic, such as computers and
electronic equipment, and some in the non-strategic group, such as automotive, chemical
processes and non-computer machinery. But although both groups of industries use
software in products and in the design of products, the substitution effect is observed
only in the strategic group. It seems unlikely this pattern is simply coincidence.

43

The coefficient for programmers is negative and significant. One interpretation of this is that firms
shifting from manufacturing to services may reduce their R&D and increase their IT resources, resulting in
an increase in the employment share of programmers. The mean change in programmer employment share
is .001, so the net effect is not very large. Moreover, using interaction regressions, we found that this effect
is largely limited to non-manufacturing industries.
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5. Variation by Firm Size, Incumbency, and Other Factors

Some researchers suggest that stronger patent protection for software may facilitate
vertical dis-integration. In particular, small firms may have increased their software R&D
in order to acquire more patents to license or sell to large firms. If this were so, software
patents might complement R&D at small firms. On the other hand, if software patents are
associated with strategic patenting, then small firms might be forced to acquire
“defensive” patents and they might also face lower appropriability. Then R&D would
substitute for software patents at small firms.
Column 4 explores the effect of firm size by interacting the change in software
share with dummies for firms of small and medium employment size (less than or equal
to 1,000 employees and greater than 1,000 but less than or equal to 10,000).44 The
coefficients on these interaction terms thus indicate differences between the smaller size
classes and large firms. Large firms exhibit the strongest substitution effect, but the
effects for the smaller classes are not significantly different statistically. And the smallest
size class hardly differs from the largest class. These results do not support the view that
the substitution is purely a large firm effect or that software patents have encouraged
greater R&D among small firms.
Column 5 looks at the related question of differences between incumbent and
entrant firms. It adds an interaction of the change in software share with a dummy
variable that is 1 if the firm entered Compustat after 1985. There were 297 observations
where this dummy was set in this regression. Here again, the substitution effect for
entrants differs only slightly from the effect for incumbents and this difference is not
statistically significant. We repeated the regressions in Columns 3 to 5 for just the group
of firms in the strategic patenting industries and obtained similar results.
We also conducted other regressions (not shown), which included additional
controls for firm size (lagged log deflated sales), new firms, firm risk (standard deviation
of annual stock price growth), and liquidity (change in long-term debt divided by
capital). Including these control variables had little effect on the coefficient on software
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share. Finally, we considered the role of accounting changes but concluded this could not
explain the observed relationship between software patents and R&D intensity.45

Interpreting Our Results

V.

While our empirical technique cannot identify the causal relationships, it does reveal a
number of patterns we can compare to a variety of theories about the effects of extending
patent protection to computer programs. For example, the facts seem difficult to reconcile
with the traditional incentive hypothesis.46
Our results make quite clear that software patenting by and large has little to do
with the pre-packaged software industry. That industry acquires a very small fraction of
all software patents. Although it has been argued that software patents may encourage
entry into an industry dominated by powerful firms, software entrants have a relatively
low software patent propensity. However, we do not have a comprehensive picture of all
entrant firms.
Two-thirds of all software patents are obtained by a small group of industries
known for strategic patenting (SIC 35, 36, 38 and IBM). Moreover, this group appears to
play a unique role throughout our analysis. This group has a much higher propensity to
obtain software patents and, in the 1990s, appears to have substituted these patents for
R&D. For firms in other industries, there does not appear to be any relationship between
an increasing focus on software patenting and R&D investments.
We think the central role of this group of industries is not accidental—that is, the
phenomenon we observe with software patents may be the same phenomenon other
researchers have observed for patenting in general for these industries:
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Of the 2,991 observations, 432 have employment less than 1,000 and 1,177 have employment greater
than 10,000.
45 Beginning in 1985, the FASB required firms to capitalize software development expenses (but not
research or maintenance expense, which usually account for most software costs). Based on some simple
calculations (details available from authors) we find that this change can explain neither the timing nor the
sign of our results.
46 In this discussion it is important to recall that the estimated effects are based on patentability
standards as they existed after the early 1980s. It is possible the effects might have been different under
different (say higher) patentability standards, but that question cannot be addressed here.
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1. Firms in these industries report that patents are relatively less effective compared to
firms in other industries, yet they obtain patents to aid negotiations, to crosslicense, to block competitors, and to prevent suits (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh 2000). Firms in some of these industries engage in strategic
cross-licensing of whole portfolios (Grindley and Teece 1997, Hall and Ziedonis
2001). These industries have rapidly increased their rates of patenting in general
(Hall 2003).
Our results are consistent with the explanation that these industries acquired large
numbers of software patents because they became a cost-effective means of
building strategic portfolios.
2. The growth in patenting overall exhibits a sharp break in 1984 (Hall 2003). Patent
propensity in the semiconductor industry also began a sharp and steady rise
beginning in 1984 (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). We find a sharp rise in software
patent propensity beginning in about 1984 (see Figure 1) that continues to increase
at just about the same rate as Hall and Ziedonis found for all patents in the
semiconductor industry.
A consistent explanation is that the formation of the unified court of appeals for
patents in the early 80s initiated changes in patent law that increased the cost
effectiveness of patents, especially software patents. In industries prone to strategic
patenting, this might have set off an “arms race” to build large portfolios, and
obtaining software patents became a convenient way to accomplish this goal.
3. Among firms in the strategic patenting industries, we find evidence that software
patents substituted for R&D during the 90s. This, too, is consistent with strategic
patenting of various sorts (Bessen 2003). Maturing firms with diminished
competitive advantage from technology might choose to harvest patent royalties
from their past research in lieu of further R&D, especially if legal changes make
patents more cost effective.47 In turn, other firms, facing increased payment of
47

For example, when Louis Gerstner Jr. became CEO of IBM in 1993, he slashed R&D by over $1
billion and also shifted the business much more toward services, so that the R&D-to-sales ratio has
declined steadily. At the same time he initiated a much more aggressive patent-licensing strategy.
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royalties, may choose to reduce R&D, possibly diverting resources to build
“defensive” patent portfolios. In these cases, greater software patenting would be
associated with decreased R&D intensity.
Strategic patenting provides a parsimonious explanation for our main results.
Note that “strategic patenting” may involve several different forms of related behavior
(see Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) and different causal mechanisms for the observed
negative correlation between an increased focus on software patents and declining
relative R&D intensity (e.g., diminished technological opportunity for mature firms or
defensive patenting for small firms).
The combination of our results is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that
software patents increased R&D incentives. It would require several coincidences: Rising
patent propensity must result from a very large increase in the productivity of R&D
(beginning about 1984) that occurs in only a handful of industries (but not the software
industry) and yet without regard to the hardware/software distinction. It must also be the
case that demand for R&D is price inelastic in those same industries, but not in the rest of
the economy. This seems a rather unlikely combination.
Our interpretation might seem to conflict with the findings of Arora, Ceccagnoli,
and Cohen (2003). They find that firms’ ratings of “patent effectiveness,” as reported in
the Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) are positively correlated
with a measure of patent propensity. They also find that patent effectiveness is often
positively correlated with R&D spending. But Arora et al. are estimating a crosssectional effect, while our results may reflect a shift in an industry equilibrium that
cannot be observed in cross-sectional data. This is particularly true because strategic
patenting may have characteristics of a “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Policy changes may
encourage firms to acquire more patents, yet, because other firms are also acquiring
larger portfolios, the equilibrium result may be lower appropriability (Bessen 2003). In
other words, Arora et al. show how R&D varies with patent effectiveness while we
explore how changing patent policy might have changed the relationship between patent
effectiveness and R&D.
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VI. Conclusion

The rapid growth in software patenting has not been driven by the software publishing
industry, but instead by a group of industries in computers, electronics and instruments.
Other researchers have established the role of strategic patenting in these industries and
strategic patenting provides a parsimonious explanation for our results. According to this
theory, software patents are significant because they provide a cost-effective way for
firms to build strategic patent portfolios.
Legal scholars sometimes argue that patent law should treat computer programs
no differently than any other invention. This paper does not address arguments about
legal consistency, but instead explores the economic effects of granting software patents
in the U.S. during the 1990s. Our results are difficult to reconcile with the traditional
incentive theory—that granting more patents will increase R&D investments. Rather, if
legal changes have encouraged strategic patenting, the result might well be less
innovation.
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APPENDIX
A. Search Algorithm
The search query used is:
((“software” in specification) OR (“computer” AND “program” in specification))
AND (utility patent excluding reissues)
ANDNOT (“chip” OR “semiconductor” OR “bus” OR “circuit” OR “circuitry” in title) ANDNOT
(“antigen” OR “antigenic” OR “chromatography” in specification)

Table A1. Summary Statistics
Total R&D
Performing
Sample

Table 5 Sample

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Median

Annual successful
patent applications

25.9

1

70.2

10

Software patent
applications

3.6

0

13.4%

2.7%

Firm sales (mill. $96)

2,632.7

375.1

1,032.0

41.6

4,967.5

1,100.1

1,579.0

83.0

Firm R&D (mill. $96)

100.2

11.7

36.8

2.8

190.9

29.8

59.6

4.0

Percent not reporting
R&D

27.9%
13.3

Median

Corresponding
R&D Performing
Sample

Mean

Firm employees
(1000s)

Mean

Table 7 Sample

--

--

2.4

21.4

-6.0

7.0

Percent new firms

10.0%

37.2%

10.7%

31.6%

No. of observations

13,136

28,581

2,991

11,107

No. of firms

1,443

4,559

489

2,351

1987 - 97

0.6

1991 - 97

Note: The total R&D sample corresponding to Table 5 consists of all Compustat observations for US firms
with non-missing R&D. The sample corresponding to Table 7 consists of all Compustat observations for
US firms with non-missing or non-zero R&D for the current year and the 5-year lag. Sales and R&D are
deflated using the GDP deflator. New firms are firms during the first five years in which they appeared in
Compustat.
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Table 1. Number of Software Patents
Patents Issued
Software
Patents

Successful Patent
Applications

Aharonian Total Utility
Estimates
Patents

Software/
Total

Software Total Utility
Patents
Patents

1976

765

100

70,226

1.1%

853

65,804

1977

884

100

65,269

1.4%

1,094

65,978

1978

897

150

66,102

1.4%

1,170

65,601

1979

795

200

48,854

1.6%

1,439

65,726

1980

1,080

250

61,819

1.7%

1,633

66,491

1981

1,275

300

65,771

1.9%

1,821

63,910

1982

1,402

300

57,888

2.4%

2,233

65,009

1983

1,443

350

56,860

2.5%

2,297

61,563

1984

1,939

400

67,200

2.9%

2,641

67,071

1985

2,453

500

71,661

3.4%

2,924

71,442

1986

2,657

600

70,860

3.7%

3,482

75,088

1987

3,530

800

82,952

4.3%

4,055

81,458

1988

3,495

800

77,924

4.5%

4,841

90,134

1989

4,974

1,600

95,537

5.2%

5,755

96,077

1990

4,704

1,300

90,364

5.2%

6,471

99,254

1991

5,347

1,500

96,513

5.5%

7,091

100,016

1992

5,862

1,624

97,444

6.0%

8,149

103,307

1993

6,756

2,400

98,342

6.9%

9,459

106,848

1994

8,031

4,569

101,676

7.9%

12,251

120,380

1995

9,000

6,142

101,419

8.9%

16,617

137,661

1996

11,359

9,000

109,645

10.4%

17,085

131,450

1997

12,262

13,000

111,983

10.9%

13,087

114,881

1998

19,355

17,500

147,519

13.1%

1999

20,385

21,000

153,486

13.3%

2000

21,065

--

157,595

13.4%

2001

23,406

--

166,158

14.1%

2002
24,891
-167,438
14.9%
Note: Utility patents excluding re-issues. Successful patent applications are the number of patent
applications that resulted in patent grants by the end of 1999.
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Table 2. Characteristics of Software Patents (1990-95)
Software
Patents

Other Patents

Assignee type
Non-gov’t. org. (firm)
Individual/ unassigned
Government

88%
11%
2%

80%
18%
2%

U.S. assignee (if assigned)

70%

51%

U.S. inventor

69%

53%

Mean citations received
Number of claims
Percent of self-citations

9.7
16.8
12%

4.6
12.6
13%

Percent of patents owned by
63%
63%
top 5 percent of assignees
Note: Total patents: 39,700 software, 546,058 other. Self-citations is average of upper and lower
bounds (see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001a). Differences between the means in the first two
columns are all significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 3. Firm Characteristics by Patent Type (1990-99)
Software
Patents
24,485

Non-software
Patents
11,554

Median firm sales
(million $96)

13,382

8,940

Median firm R&D
(million $96)

956

376

Newly public firm

5.8%

5.1%

Median firm market value
(million $96)

Note: Table shows patent characteristics by type for years 1990-99 from the sample matched to
Compustat. Covers 48,072 software patents and 274,529 non-software patents. Newly public
firms first appeared in the Compustat file within the last 5 years.

48

Table 4. Successful Software Patent Applications by Industry
(1994-97)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Engineers

All
patents

All
Patents/
R&D

Software
patent
propensity
(Table 5.2)

Share of all
Prog. +

Software
patents

Prog.

75%

11%

32%

88%

3.8

Chemicals (SIC 28)

5%

1%

2%

15%

2.5

1.5

Machinery (SIC 35)

24%

3%

7%

17%

4.2

4.4

Electronics (SIC 36)

28%

2%

7%

27%

6.8

9.6

Instruments (SIC 38)

9%

1%

4%

11%

7.1

8.7

Other manu.

9%

5%

13%

18%

2.3

1.9

25%

89%

68%

12%

3.0

1%

1.0

1%

2.8

Manufacturing

Non-manufacturing
Software publishers
(SIC 7372)

5%

Other software (SIC
737 exc. 7372, IBM)

2%

Other nonmanufacturing
Addendum: IBM


 33%


18%

4%

55%

49%

4%

3.4

6%

--

--

2%

5.0

1.0
(all SIC 73)

3.8

Note: covers 28,268 software patents and 148,552 total patents for firms in the sample of
software patents matched by CUSIP to firms in Compustat. The numbers are for patent
applications that were resulted in an issued patent by 1999. Programmer employment is the share
of total employment accounted for by computer programmers and systems analysts in 1997 from
the Occupational Employment Survey of the BLS (which includes government employees). The
third column adds employment of engineers. For SIC 737 the combined employment shares also
include IBM. The fifth column shows patents granted per $10 million of R&D in 1996 dollars.
The last column is the exponential of the coefficient for the industry given in Table 5, column 3,
normalized so that the patent propensity of SIC 73 equals one. The last row shows IBM’s patents
as a portion of all patents (not just those in our matched sample).
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Table 5. The Propensity to Patent Software
Dependent Variable: Annual Number of Successful Software Patents Applications
1

2

3

4

Annual
Contribution

5

Ln employment

.88

(.03)*

.88

(.03)*

.88

(.03)*

.88

(.03)*

.62

(.02)*

0.5%

Ln R&D / Emp.

1.01

(.05)*

.77

(.06)*

.77

(.06)*

.78

(.05)*

.22

(.02)*

1.1%

No R&D dummy

-1.00

(.17)*

-.47

(.18)*

-.49

(.18)*

-.16

(.19)

.35

(.12)*

-0.1%

Ln Capital / Emp.

-.08

(.04)

.37

(.05)*

.37

(.05)*

.26

(.05)*

.27

(.03)*

1.8%

(3.09)*

7.21

(.84)*

13.32

(.75)*

1.2%

(.55)*

6.57

(.44)*

6.06

(.58)*

1.2%

Programmers / Emp.

12.44

Engineers / Emp.
New firm dummy

4.13
.19

(.13)

.03

(3.13)*
(.55)*
(.13)

New firm x SIC 73

12.75
4.05
.12

(.15)

-.90

(.33)*

Other patents / Emp.

.11

(.13)

.16

(.02)*

Industry dummies
SIC 28

-5.58

(.32)*

-5.52

(.31)*

SIC 35

-4.50

(.25)*

-4.45

(.25)*

SIC 36

-3.73

(.24)*

-3.68

(.23)*

SIC 38

-3.83

(.25)*

-377

(.25)*

Other manu.

-5.33

(.25)*

-5.26

(.25)*

SIC 73

-5.99

(.63)*

-5.96

(.62)*

Other non-manu.

-4.65

(.28)*

-4.58

(.28)*

Yes

Firm fixed effects
Period estimated

80 - 97

87 – 97

87 – 97

87 – 97

87 – 97

Annual growth rate of
year dummies

10.3%

9.4%

9.5%

7.2%

10.8%

No. observations

23,108

13,136

13,136

13,136

6,587

Log Likelihood

-68,548

-42,963

-42,870

-48,528

-9,659

Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include year
dummies; columns 1 and 4 include an intercept (not shown). Asterisk indicates significance at
the 1 percent level. Regressions are Poisson regressions. Column 5 has firm fixed effects
(Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). R&D is deflated by the GDP deflator, capital is property,
plant and equipment deflated by the NIPA capital goods deflator, and employment is in
thousands. The “new firm” dummy is equal to one for the first five years a firm appears in
Compustat. Other patents / employees is the ratio of patents to employees for other firms in the
same 2-digit SIC industry for the given year. Annual growth rate of year dummies is year
dummy for 1996 minus the year dummy for the earliest year divided by the number of years
elapsed (no dummy is estimated for 1997). Annual contribution is the estimated coefficient times
the difference in sample means for the variable between 1996 and 1987 divided by 9 (the number
of years).
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Table 6. R&D Cost Share Estimation
R&D
Cost

∆

WLS

Heckman

1991-97

1991-97

∆

1

∆s

-.039

R&D
Cost

-.030

∆

WLS

WLS

Heckman

WLS

1991-97

1991-97

1991-97

1985 - 97

3

2
(.017)

R&D
Sales

∆ ln Sales

(.003)*

∆ ln C

.007
1.018

∆

4
(.071)

-.037

R&D
Sales

5
(.006)*

-.037

∆

R&D
Sales

6
(.002)*

(.024)*

∆s x (1985-89)

.018

(.012)

∆s x (1990-93)

-.031

(.012)*

∆s x (1994-97)

-.050

(.015)*

No. total
observations

774

29,832

774

2,991

29,832

5,285

(firm years)
No. selected

757

LR test of probit
Wald test of
independent
equations
Adjusted R

2

2,913

2

.128

2

χ (9) = 1059.9

χ (9) = 3370.6

P=.000

P=.000

χ2(1) = 571.6

χ2(1) = .04

P=.000

P=.839

--

.974

.038

--

.066

Note: Observations are firm-years, but differences are taken over five years. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and changes in log factor prices.
The prices are for capital, labor, energy, materials, services and IT for the two-digit industry
from the BLS. Asterisk indicates significance at the 1 percent level. For columns 1, 3, 4, and 6,
the sample includes firms matched to patent file with positive patents and non-missing data. All
regressions are weighted by 1 (1 nit + 1 ni ,t −5 ) where n is the number of patents granted. s is
software share of patents applications. The Heckman sample selection equations consist of a
regression equation and a selection probit. The regression coefficients are shown, the probit
regressors are log market value, log sales, new firm flag and time dummies. To measure the
goodness of fit for the probit, we show a likelihood ratio test that all coefficients except the
constant term are zero. To determine whether sample selection biases the coefficients, we show a
Wald test that the selection and regression equations are independent. In columns 4-6,
observations are excluded where R&D > ½ sales (see text).
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Table 7. R&D Intensity Estimation, 1991-97
Dependent Variable: ∆

R&D
Sales
1

2

∆s

.001

3
(.010)

∆Programmers/Emp.
∆Engineers / Emp.

4

-034

(.011)*

-.506

(.136)*

.120

(.087)

∆s x (Emp. ≤ 1,000)
∆s x (1,000<Emp.
≤ 10,000)

-.051

(.018)*

.007

(.030)

.039

(.022)

∆s x (Entrant)
∆s x strategic industry

-.060

5
-.037

(.011)*

.002

(.028)

(.019)*

∆s x SIC 28

.029

(.031)

∆s x SIC 35

-.029

(.010)*

∆s x SIC 36

-.090

(.026)*

∆s x SIC 38

.027

(.028)

∆s x Other manu.

.014

(.013)

∆s x SIC 73

-.077

(.031)*

∆s x other non-manu.

-.053

(.044)

No. observations

2,991

2,991

2,967

2,991

2,991

.060

.051

.058

.045

.043

Adjusted R

2

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and changes
in annual log factor prices at the two-digit industry level. Asterisk indicates significance at the 1
percent level. Time differences are five years and observations are firm years. Sample includes
firms matched to patent file with positive patents and excludes observations where R&D > ½
sales. ∆programmers/total employment and ∆engineers/total employment are the changes in the
shares of the respective occupational employment for the three-digit industry. All regressions are
weighted by 1 (1 nit + 1 ni ,t −5 ) where n is the number of patents granted. s is software share of

patents granted, sales are deflated, and “Entrant” is a dummy for firms that entered the
Compustat database after 1985. “Strategic industries” are SIC 357 (computers), SIC 36
(electrical), SIC 38 (instruments) and IBM.
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Figure 1. Year Dummies, Software Patent Propensity Regressions
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Source: Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Table 5. Year dummies from Poisson regressions
correspond to log relative patent propensity. Normalized to 1 in 1987.
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